Representation of War in the Media

Representation of state of war in the MediaCHAPTER III CASE STUDIESWar is fought with the will of the g all overnment, competence of the armed forces and the support of the nationCarl Von ClausewitzThere is no doubt that the global reach and immediacy of the new media communications technologies and the abi illuminatey to shape some(prenominal) interior(a) and global public opinion has made media a major player in limited conflicts. such developments could be expected to signifi passeltly impact the way conflict is report and debated by international community. given over the rapid progress and far reaching advances in communications over recent years, correct action with the media acts as a force multiplier for the commander on ground to achieve a more than comprehensive success. On the other hand, the amiss(p) media engagement leads to loss of operational security and makes the task of the armed forces commander much more difficult.The media representation of wars has si gnifi rumptly changed over last years. Previously macrocosm just an instrument of coverage and propaganda, now media are considered a competent weapon. The war of real objects is partially being replaced by the war of pictures and sounds, schooling war1. Now we shall examine hardly a(prenominal) operative national and international conflicts, where the media extensively cover these trading operations by the Armed Forces. Some were a success story while others left much to be desired form the way the Armed Forces engage the media.The disconnection War function of the media during the Gulf war followed the pattern that was established in the Falklands and refined in Grenada and Panama2. The pattern included privateness in planning, demonisation of the enemy, exploitation of the media to enlist national and international support, and the exclusion of the media during the sign phases of the operation3. The resultant intelligence agencyworthiness vacuum was filled by officia lcoverage favourable to the soldiery. Later criticisms were stonewalled.In the Gulf, the media were excluded from the planning stages of the initial deployment and the deliberations leading to the change of war aims from that of the defence of Saudi Arabia to offensive action in Kuwait. The demonisation of ibn Talal Hussein Hussein was used to rally national as well as international support and the media was like a shot co-opted into these tasks4. The Gulf also demonstrated the familiar pattern of exclusion of the media from the early action, when both the force and the organization were most vulnerable5.Before the commencement of the hostilities, USA set up the Joint Information Bureau to cover the media from a base in Dhahran. Journalists were formed into puddles or Media Reporting Teams (MRTs).Guidelines were instituted, concurrent with the arrival of the freshman pool of reporters6. Subsequent guidelines gave detailed instructions how the information could be ga thered. A ll interviews could be conducted hardly in the carriage of a soldiery escort, all reports, photos and videos had to be cleared by a security review remains before transmission.Beyond these measures, however, the Gulf campaign lent itself to complete media management through absolute see to it over the means of communication, transport and access. So powerful was this weaponry that there was no need for unquestionable censorship7. Censorship was achieved primarily through denial of access and delay in transmission, backed a covering crowd out decision not to allow media access to whatever(prenominal) event that was a strictly controlled. This was offset by a flow of favourable military sourced information to fill the vacuum created by media restriction. Material ranged from information provided at carefully controlled briefings which bypassed journalists on the spot. The combination of credibility afforded by the briefings and novelty of the new weaponry was affluent to sa tisfy audiences8.The realities of war and any real analysis were foregone in favour of a politicallyacceptable, sanitised war which showed nothing but success. It was evident too thatthe military used the media not only to present its own policies in the best possible light, but to deceive and misinform the Iraqis.Both the memorial tablet and the military clearly benefited from this control. CNNs coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, when it became the worlds only instant chronicler of a major conflict, seemed only to indorse the for middleable role played by Western intelligence activity agencies in covering and framing international events. The impact of this kind of media coverage has been dubbed the CNN effect, referring to the widely available round-the-clock broadcasts of the Cable News Nedeucerk9. Indeed, by the mid 1990s, around scholars and certain policymakers had come to the conclusion that CNN in particular was having a measurable impact on the way governments conduct world politics.This proactive engagement of media by the Pentagon ensured that the military remains immune from interrogation but also garners the voter benefits for the politicians. The only caution is that this form of media containment or partial exclusion can only work for a limited period. If, as in Vietnam and as may well find happened in the Gulf, such a limited conflict becomes protracted and involves high school levels of casualties, then the ascendancy of the military may be challenged and broken as the global media brings to bear the full weight of its capacity for freelance news gathering and communications.The 1991 Gulf war was the first televised war of the century wherein pictures of the night sky lit up with firing of weapons. exertion Desert Storm was the most widely and most swiftly report war in history. In addition to being called the first CNN War this war also mark a turning point for the Americans view of that relationship. US demonstrated will and military potential drop to influence developing world in consonance of her policies.10 The world saw the wear footage of the 1991 Gulf war. CNN activities during the war were a classic example of the role that civil broadcasts and journalists can play in any future war. Media can be allowed selective access with a view to influencing the international opinion. The media enjoys the support of high technology equipment and access to credible media outlets. The CNN broadcasts provided useful inputs to put into operation diplomatic damage limitation operations to counter the fallout of adverse reports. The example at hand is the demonstration of her will and the military potential by the USA in influencing the world opinion, including engaging the media11.The first Iraqi war was totally covered by the media and the general opinion was that the media was focussing all their attention on the wars victory and retreating troops. Very few journalists looked after the Arabian people in fact the Iraq i refugee problem was simply overlooked. In general, the media was really supportive of the American troops in the Persian Gulf. Though the reporting was positive, the coverage did not report the absolute truth on the battle field. Journalists were more or less welcomed by the battalion commanders. The host was silent to embedding the media, while the Marine Corps was proactive and welcomed media attention. Public satisfaction with press coverage can be largely attributed to the change magnitude media savvy of the military leadership, who were able to successfully use news coverage to enhance the militarys image and win public support for its operations. General Schwarzkopf was a archetype at these press briefings. He analyzed the importance of the briefings and prepared himself mentally. He decided not to repeating the mistake made in Grenada, where the relations between media and the military had been eroded to an appalling state12.Kargil A wet Shed for Indian MediaThe Kar gil conflict was Indias first real war of the information age and it was significant for the impact and the influence of the mass media on the public opinion of both the nation states13. During this operation, both the military and the media were interacting for the very first time in the backdrop of the technological advances made in the last two three decades or so. The Kargil news stories and war footage were often televise live on the TV, while legion(predicate) vanesites provided in-depth analysis of the war. This conflict became the first live war in South Asia14. The Indian armament time- essayed to implement the pool methodology of the Gulf war after consulting some reputed and esteemed media persons. There were day-after-day briefings in Delhi through the operational staff and journalists were allowed to enter the war zone15. The site tours were discontinued after some time and media persons got total freedom to move around on their own except where their lives could be in danger. But unlike the Gulf war, there was to be no censoring of media reports and there was to be no deviation from the truth16. The military and the media did not indulge in any deliberate disinformation drive. But they effectively undecided Pakistans lies and disinformation tactics.The media for once highlighted defence requirements of weaponry and ammunition which otherwise do not get any significance for reporting in the normal sequence of events.17. The Kargil War, also brought into focus the significance of both the print and the electronic media18. The nation made a very clever use of the Internet and dedicated an exclusive Website www.vijayinkargil.com to show case the heroics of the Indian Army. Trained PR officers manned chat sites on the web to establish a real time inter face with the youths of the country for possibly the very first time.Television was able to invade the living rooms of the people to shape public opinion. The war true a human face because of the wide scale coverage of the war by the news impart like Aaj Tak, Zee News and NDTV Network. The media both Indian and overseas was predominantly compassionate to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that our western adversary was in lead story answerable for the conflict19. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil20 and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.Media reportage on Kargil converged around a atomic number 53 dramatic image of a nation at war. In the initial phase, news coverage was hold back on the logic of operational security. The Army permitted first media coverage on 15 May 1999. In Jun 1999, travel permits of press personnel were cancelled again quoting compromise of security. The failure of understanding was due to incorrect handling of media by army as well as character and content of reportage. There was a tendency to trivialise and sensationalise news by many sections of media. The semantics of reportage of certain events like return of sixer tortured bodies, led to a proliferation of exaggerated stories.However, media did not act as the force multiplier throughout. At crucial junctures, the over ecstatic media reported the crucial attack plans of the Indian army on the news in advance. This gave the all important operational intelligence to the adversary. The glaring example of this was the attack on tiger Hill, where in after capture of Tiger Hill, the captured Pakistani troops revealed that they received the inputs about the Indian Armys plans through the news channels. Also the telecast at quantify showed the location of the artillery hero sandwich bases, deployment areas and the logistic installations which was then suitably interpreted by the enemy to bring out effective fire on these locations.Mumbai Terrorist Attacks of 26/11Medias reporting of fearist activities is fast becoming critical in todays scenario when no country is left untouched by terrorism. War on terrorism is a test for the Indian media. How much should be broadcast, whether broadcast of terrorist actions amounts to glorifying terrorism and violence and whether it incites people, creates new recruits and gives publicity to terrorists who seek to enchant world attention are topics of debate across nations in the post 9/11 world. equivalent debates have begun in India, more so after 26/11 Mumbai attacks.The well coordinated terror attack on Mumbai brings about essential lessons, both for the media as well as the Armed forces. The news media with a lack of understanding of where the medium can reach in such a situation, reported the move of National Security Guard (NSG) from Delhi to Mumbai being declared by the Home Minister21. There is increasing questioning of the medias conduct in the face of such attacks and more so after the live telecast of the 60 hour long Mumbai attacks. Concerned over the way many aspects of its operations got jeopardized due to live images being broadcast by TV during the 6- hour siege, the National Security Guard (NSG) pressed for restrictions on media coverage wherever its commandos are engaged to combat22.The case in point is the way NSGs operations at Nariman House were broadcast live. Questions were raised over the way Havaldar Gajender Singh fell to a terrorists bullet at Nariman House. As per the narration of incidents by an NSG commando TV broadcasted our commandoes landing from a helicopter on the roof over Nariman House. By the time our men landed and started taking positions, the terrorists were already waiting for us and opened fire23.In contrast the operations at Oberoi could be conducted more smoothly since TV channel s were kept beyond a one-kilometer radius24. This zone was put under virtual curfew with no access allowed to television crews. The operations there took the least time, just under 30 hours, as compared to the other two places. As per NSG officials while terrorists holed up inside probably did not have access to live TV images on the second and three day of operations, they still had phones and were probably getting instructions from people watching those live images on TV. The media in turn can question the NSG that was there any spokesman of NSG to guide the media? The media showed what they saw. Can you blame them for showing what was occurrent?1 Gulf War Was A Perfect Television War http//www.ukessays.com/essays/media/gulf-war-was-a-perfect-television-war-media-essay.php2 Young and Jesser, Loc cit, pp 280-2813 Ibid, pp 1764 Ibid5 Ibid, pp1896 Ibid7 Ibid8 Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islami a, New Delhi 20109The CNN Effect Strategic Enabler or Operational insecurity? Margaret H. Belknap http//strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/02autumn/belknap.htm10 Brig VK Nair,VSM,Retd. War in the Gulf Lessons For The Third World, Lancer Papers, pp 106.11 Ibid12 Vice Admiral J Metcalfe, The Press and the Grenada 1983, Franc Cass Co. Ltd, London pp 16813 Operation Vijay 1999 Victory Over Pak Treachery Col J P Singh, Retd News Bharti English 25 Jul 201414 Kargil War Wikipedia, online http//www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war.15 Kargil War Wikipedia, online http//www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war16 Ibid.17 Ibid.18 Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi 201019Article titled The Significance of the Kargil Crisis pp18-19, RAND Publications http//www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch2.pdf20 Ibid21 Rahul K Bhonsle, Mumbai 26/11- Secu rity Imperatives for the Future, New Delhi Vij Books (India) Pvt Ltd pp 50-5122 Media has railway line of NSG Commandoes http//nomadmolouges.blogspot.in/2008/12/media-has-blood-of-nsg-commando.html23 Ibid24 Indian Media And War Maturity Essay http//www.ukessays.com/essays/media/indian-media-and-war-maturity-media-essay.php